NEVER QUITE THE WOMAN THAT SHE WANTED TO BE: HOW STATE POLICIES TRANSFORM GENDER MARKER IDENTIFICATION INTO A SCARLET LETTER

Kayla Anne Baker*

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................................. 3
I. STATE APPROACHES TO DEFINING AND AMENDING GENDER ON STATE DOCUMENTS .......................................................................................................................... 5
   A. Birth Certificates .................................................................................................................................. 6
   B. Driver’s Licenses .................................................................................................................................... 8
II. OVERVIEW OF SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS ....................................................................................... 10
   A. The Fundamental Rights Test ............................................................................................................... 10
   B. Individual-State Balancing Test ........................................................................................................... 13
III. ANALYSIS .................................................................................................................................................. 13
   A. Fundamental Rights Analysis ............................................................................................................... 13
      1. Is There a Fundamental Right Involved? ............................................................................................ 14
      2. Does the State Policy Infringe on the Right? .................................................................................... 15
         i. Direct Burdens .................................................................................................................................. 17
         ii. Incidental Burdens ......................................................................................................................... 20
      3. Is the Government Action Justified by Sufficient Purpose? ......................................................... 21

* B.A. University of Mary Washington; J.D. Candidate, 2016, Case Western Reserve University, School of Law. I would like to give a special thanks to Jessie Hill for her selfless contribution towards my research and Jennifer Cupar for teaching me all I know about legal writing. Additional thanks to my family, John, Theresa, James, Jeff, Chloe, Rosemary, and Ed for their unending support. Thanks to Adrienne, Shanleigh, and Lauren for being three of the best friends a girl could have. Finally, thanks Emile Lester for being there for me when I really needed it. I could not have done this alone; it took a village.

B. Cruzan Balancing Analysis.......................................................... 24

IV. IDEAL POLICY PROPOSAL ......................................................... 26

CONCLUSION ................................................................................. 27
INTRODUCTION

The day was February 28, 2014, and it was the spring semester of my first year in law school. I worked hard during the fall semester, and I positioned myself well for the summer job hunt. That day, I had a meeting with a clerk at the Carl B. Stokes Courthouse to work as a judicial extern. The meeting was largely a formality to sort out some clerical issues. Nonetheless, I was terrified: In our email exchange, the law clerk had asked me to bring my birth certificate.

I arrived at the courthouse and was awestruck. I had not yet visited downtown Cleveland, and coming from rural Virginia, I had never seen so many thirty and forty-story buildings. I found the courthouse, went through security, and then arrived at the courtroom. I met the clerk, and she showed me chambers. I was fascinated: I was a few weeks away from working for a federal judge in an office with an amazing view of a big city. I felt like I had finally made it. The clerk and I made small talk about school and Cleveland before getting to business. I sat down in her office and she began filling out paperwork. She asked me to hand her my driver’s license and I did. She jotted some notes on a piece of paper. Then she asked for my birth certificate and I handed it to her folded up. I looked at the ground, my heart pounding. She opened it, stopped writing, and said, perplexed, “No, I need to see your birth certificate.” I responded meekly, “That is my birth certificate.” I did not look up to see her reaction, but I heard her resume her writing.

My birth certificate confused her because she saw a female named Kayla, yet my birth certificate listed me as John and my gender as male. This discrepancy exists because I am transgender, and my birth state refuses to amend names or gender markers on a transgender person’s birth certificate absent sex reassignment surgery (reassignment surgery). Before I could work for the court, I had to disclose to the clerk the most private aspect of my life. My experience at the courthouse is the norm: An overwhelming 76 percent of transgender individuals do not possess gender-conforming birth certificates, and another 41 percent do not possess gender-conforming driver’s licenses or state identification cards. I was lucky that the courthouse still accepted me as an extern; many others are not so fortunate.

This Note argues that a transgender person has a substantive due process right to change gender markers on state documents without undergoing reassignment surgery. Today, both the World Professional Association for Transgender Health (WPATH) and the American Medical Association (AMA) recognize that a person’s gender transition is individualized and variable. Thus,

1. See infra Appendix A.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 54 (44% of transgender individuals report being discriminated against in hiring); see also Schroer v. Billington, 525 F. Supp. 2d 58, 60–61 (D.D.C. 2007) (stating that the Library of Congress rescinded a job offer to an individual after learning that she planned to transition from male to female).
they do not believe that states should require reassignment surgery as a precondition to amending documentation.\(^6\) In spite of this medical consensus, the majority of states continue to require reassignment surgery to amend birth certificates,\(^7\) and many states require reassignment surgery to amend driver’s licenses.\(^8\) Due to financial hardship or bodily autonomy, however, many transgender people cannot or do not undergo reassignment surgery.\(^9\)

State policies that ignore this medical consensus harm transgender individuals by imposing the state’s view of gender validity upon them. Highlighting this is the fact that many state courts refer to transgender people using the pronouns associated with their birth sex,\(^10\) or worse, in Frankensteinian terms that imply that the person is an oddity if not a monster.\(^11\) In addition, many legislatures are slow to change policies pertaining to state documents and may excessively burden transgender people who try to change gender markers on identification documents.

For two reasons, this Note proposes substantive due process as a constitutional basis for transgender individuals’ right to obtain gender-conforming state documents. First, gay and lesbian advocates have had recent success invoking substantive due process to invalidate laws banning same-sex marriage under both the U.S. Constitution and state constitutions.\(^12\) Given these gains, substantive due process might also be a source to strengthen existing protections for transgender people. Second, even if courts find that federal substantive due process does not invalidate the surgery requirement for amending gender on state documents, state constitutions may still hold promise. This is because many state courts interpret their constitution to provide greater substantive due process protections than the minimum afforded by the U.S. Constitution.\(^13\)

This Note proceeds as follows. Part I describes the differing state approaches to defining and amending gender on state documents. Part II summarizes substantive due process doctrine. Part III details why courts should interpret substantive due process as requiring states to permit gender marker

---

7. See generally infra Appendix A.
8. See generally infra Appendix B.
11. In re Harris, 707 A.2d at 226; see also Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1087 (7th Cir. 1984) (stating “even if one believes that a woman can be so easily created from what remains of a man”); In re Estate of Gardiner, 42 P.3d 120, 129 (Kan. 2002) (stating “her female anatomy however is all man-made”). For a more thorough discussion, see Abigail W. Lloyd, Defining the Human: Are Transgendered People Strangers to the Law?, 20 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 150, 159–74 (2005).
13. K.L. v. Alaska, Dept’t of Admin., Div. of Motor Vehicles, No. 3AN-11-05431, 2012 WL 2685183 (Alaska Super. Ct. Mar. 12, 2012) (finding that the plaintiff had a due process right to privacy under the Alaskan constitution, which the court stated is more stringent than the federal constitution, that allowed her to amend her driver’s license).
amendments on state documents without the necessity of sex reassignment surgery. It analyzes the issue by providing both a fundamental rights analysis and a *Cruzan* balancing test analysis. Finally, Part IV proposes an ideal policy solution that is consistent with constitutional doctrine. Specifically, this Note proposes that states allow transgender people to amend gender markers on state documents with a therapist’s recommendation.

I. **STATE APPROACHES TO DEFINING AND AMENDING GENDER ON STATE DOCUMENTS**

People create their legal identities vis-à-vis the government by obtaining different identification documents from a hodge-podge network of agencies. Each agency sets its own policies for amending personal identification information, such as gender marker. As a result, many states allow a transgender person to obtain a gender-conforming driver’s license, but not a gender-conforming birth certificate. Complicating matters is the fact that transgender people can only amend their birth certificates in the state where they were born.

Federal agencies differ from state agencies in issuing identity documents. Notably, federal agency policies uniformly allow amendments to gender markers with a therapist’s approval. These policies enable transgender people to use federal documents to circumvent forced disclosure in some contexts. For instance, a transgender person can prove citizenship to an employer by presenting a gender-conforming passport rather than a gender-nonconforming, state-issued birth certificate. Nonetheless, these federal agency policies are far from sufficient. There might be some instances that require a transgender person to present a gender-nonconforming state document, such as a traffic stop during which the person must present a driver’s license to law enforcement. Moreover, many people do not possess federal documentation with visible gender markers.

Additionally, requiring reassignment surgery to amend state documents places a huge burden on many transgender individuals. The cost of reassignment surgery can range from $18,000 to $150,000. Furthermore, not all transgender individuals are appropriate candidates for reassignment surgery due to health complications, weight, or age. Finally, not every transgender person desires to undergo reassignment surgery; many find the social recognition of their gender

---

15. Compare infra Appendix A, with infra Appendix B.
16. Id.
19. Silver, supra note 9, at 498 n.51 (noting that reassignment surgery for Male-to-Female transsexuals ranges from about $18,000-$35,000 and for Female-to-Male transsexuals can range from $50,000-$150,000; the cost discrepancy is largely due to surgeons having a more difficult time creating external genitalia from internal genitalia than vice versa).
identity sufficient for their emotional well-being. Thus, it is not surprising that fewer than one in four transgender people have a gender-conforming birth certificate, and a little over half possess a conforming driver’s license.

Accordingly, state-issued documents are important to consider. This Part focuses on two examples of such documents: driver’s licenses and birth certificates. These documents are the most commonly used documents for proving identity and seeking employment. Moreover, the policies governing gender marker amendments on these documents vary widely across states.

A. Birth Certificates

Forty-seven states and the District of Columbia allow gender marker amendments to birth certificates. Thirty-one of these states specifically require reassignment surgery as a prerequisite to amending birth certificates. Another sixteen states and the District of Columbia allow amendments without reassignment surgery. In these states, a person must still provide either a therapist’s approval or a doctor’s affidavit that the patient has undergone surgical or hormonal change. In contrast, three states (Tennessee, Ohio, and Idaho) refuse to amend birth certificates for transgender people under any circumstances.

This policy terrain is shaped largely by the Model State Vital Statistics Act (MSVSA) proposed in 1977 by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). The MSVSA is a model format for state documents issued periodically to "promote uniformity among States in definitions, registration practices, disclosure and issuance procedures, and in many other functions that comprise a State system of vital statistics." The MSVSA encouraged states to amend gender markers on birth certificates when “the sex of an individual . . . has been changed by surgical procedure.” Although HHS’s recommendation was only advisory, most states followed it and created policies allowing transgender people to amend birth certificates only after reassignment surgery.

20. Grant, supra note 2, at 79 (stating that 14% of MfTs and 44% of FtMs do not desire reassignment surgery).
21. Id. at 139.
22. While there are other forms of identification that are common, such as social security cards, many of these do not contain explicit gender markers. Social Security Administration, supra note 17.
23. See generally infra Appendix A; Appendix B.
24. See generally infra Appendix A. Additionally, New York City and New York State have separate agencies responsible for issuing birth certificates and differ in their requirements before issuing gender-conforming documentation. Mottet, supra note 17, at 378 n.5.
25. See infra Appendix A.
26. Id. This language is loosely taken from the District of Columbia’s and Vermont’s statutes.
27. Id. The three state are Idaho, Ohio, and Tennessee.
29. Prior to 1979, HHS was called the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.
31. Id. at 400 (emphasis omitted).
32. The MSVSA is a model bill proposed by the HHS and not a binding law passed by Congress.
33. See generally infra Appendix A.
The MSVSA further proposed that an individual obtain a court order verifying that the individual underwent reassignment surgery. Thus, fifteen states have statutes that require a court order to amend birth certificates. To obtain a court order, the individual must petition the court with a signed affidavit from a surgeon verifying that she had reassignment surgery; this process can be both tedious and embarrassing. In some states, these court orders become part of the public record, thus disclosing to society the individual’s transgender status and medical history. Another seven states deviate slightly from the MSVSA framework and allow amendments after reassignment surgery, but do not require a court order. Nonetheless, these states still require that the individual file a surgeon’s affidavit with the record-issuing agency verifying that the individual has undergone reassignment surgery.

Many states do not uniformly enforce the surgery requirement. For example, Virginia requires reassignment surgeries for transgender women (who seek to change their gender markers from male to female), but not for transgender men (who seek to change their gender markers from female to male). Instead, Virginia allows transgender men to amend their birth certificates after a mastectomy, reasoning that a mastectomy constitutes a permanent gender-related medical surgery. Virginia does not treat transgender women who undergo breast augmentation as favorably, which is an arbitrary distinction that creates a double standard.

In contrast to the MSVSA standards, six states require a court order to amend birth certificates without mentioning reassignment surgery. While this policy better respects individual autonomy, it leaves full discretion to the courts and creates disparities between individual judges and individual courts within a state. Furthermore, transgender issues are not well understood, and most courts still require reassignment surgery before issuing an order to amend.

Some states are silent as to amending gender markers on birth certificates. Absent binding authority of law, state courts and agencies have more power to create policy. In eight states, the administrative agencies issuing birth certificates require that a patient undergo reassignment surgery before amending her birth

34. See infra Appendix A. The states are Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Dakota, and Virginia.
35. Mottet, supra note 17, at 437.
36. Arizona, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, and North Carolina. See infra Appendix A.
38. Spade, supra note 14, at 768.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Indiana, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Utah, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See infra Appendix A.
43. Mottet, supra note 17, at 428.
44. Id. at 400-01.
certificate.\textsuperscript{46} Another eight states and the District of Columbia allow amendments with a therapist’s approval.\textsuperscript{47} Five states require the individual to present a therapist’s affidavit to the state agency issuing birth certificates, while three require the individual to present a therapist’s affidavit to the court and obtain a court order first.\textsuperscript{48} Ohio, Idaho, and Tennessee do not amend birth certificates under any circumstances.\textsuperscript{49} Each of these states’ policies are established in different ways: Ohio through case law, Idaho through administrative law, and Tennessee through statute.\textsuperscript{50}

\textbf{B. Driver’s Licenses}

Driver’s licenses are generally easier to amend than birth certificates. All state agencies issuing driver’s licenses allow amendments to gender markers.\textsuperscript{51} The reason for this is that unlike birth certificates, which document the circumstances surrounding one’s birth, driver’s licenses serve a more temporary state purpose of identifying individuals whom the state permits to drive.\textsuperscript{52}

The majority approach taken by twenty-six states and the District of Columbia allows gender marker amendments to driver’s licenses with only a therapist’s recommendation.\textsuperscript{53} Some of these states, however, issue amended driver’s licenses with the expectation that the individual undergo reassignment surgery in the future.\textsuperscript{54} In some of these states, the amendment is only temporary, and the individual must get another therapist’s approval letter before renewing a license or have the re-issued driver’s license display a nonconforming gender marker.

Fourteen states require reassignment surgery before amending driver’s licenses.\textsuperscript{55} The remaining ten states take differing approaches. Five states require court orders to amend driver’s licenses. As previously stated, court orders leave discretion to individual judges who typically, though not always, require reassignment surgery.\textsuperscript{56} Additionally, the order might become part of the public

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{46} Alaska, Delaware, Florida, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Texas. \textit{See infra} Appendix A.
\bibitem{47} California, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Minnesota, Mississippi, New York State, Oregon and Vermont. \textit{See infra} Appendix A.
\bibitem{48} California, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Mississippi, and New York State require only therapist approval, while Minnesota, Oregon, and Vermont require a court order. \textit{See infra} Appendix A.
\bibitem{49} \textit{See infra} Appendix A.
\bibitem{50} In Idaho, the courts leave absolute discretion to the Department of Vital Statistics, which refuses to amend birth certificates. \textit{Id.}
\bibitem{51} \textit{See infra} Appendix B.
\bibitem{52} Mottet, \textit{supra} note 17, at 391.
\bibitem{54} \textit{See} Spade, \textit{supra} note 14, at 772.
\bibitem{55} Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, and Wyoming. Noteworthy, when compared to Appendix A, these states have differing requirements for amending birth certificates. \textit{See infra} Appendix B.
\bibitem{56} Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and West Virginia. \textit{Id.}
\end{thebibliography}
record and may contain sensitive information regarding name change, medical history, and the individual's home address.\(^{57}\)

The other five states condition driver's license amendments upon obtaining conforming documentation from other administrative agencies. Alaska and Utah accept any conforming documentation, including state birth certificates and federal passports,\(^{58}\) while Iowa, Kentucky, and Montana require that the individual obtain a conforming birth certificate.\(^{59}\) Thus, these policies create an interconnected web composed of various agencies from different states. For example, an individual wishing to amend a driver's license in Kentucky is subject to both the Kentucky law and his birth state's law regarding birth certificate amendments. When state policies are as fragmented as gender marker amendments, individuals inevitably fall through the cracks. Indeed, an individual born in Tennessee or Ohio who moves to Kentucky can amend neither her birth certificate nor her driver's license.\(^{60}\) If she wants conforming documentation, then she has no option but to move to another state that does not condition driver's license amendments on birth certificate amendments.

Further complicating the amendment process is a phenomenon known as "desk-clerk law."\(^{61}\) Desk-clerk law "is what the person at the desk tells you the law is."\(^{62}\) In some cases, a clerk at a desk has more control than the actual policy over whether an individual obtains conforming documentation.\(^{63}\) Many transgender people may not know the laws and regulations that dictate gender marker amendments, and many clerks may be equally unaware.\(^{64}\) In many instances, a person can obtain conforming documentation against the state's policies because the clerk believes the old license to be a clerical error.\(^{65}\) In other instances, a vaguely worded affidavit by a physician can have the same effect.\(^{66}\) Nonetheless, the law is not enforced uniformly with regard to transgender people.

---

57. Mottet, supra note 17, at 437.
58. See infra Appendix B.
59. Id.
60. This is because the laws of Kentucky require an amended birth certificate to amend a driver's license, but certain states do not allow for birth certificate amendment, leaving the individual without options.
62. Id. at 765. This phenomenon is more likely to occur with driver's license as they are photo identification subject to periodic renewal with less guiding legislation.
63. Id.; see also Spade, supra note 14, at 775.
64. See Emens, supra note 62, at 764–65. While Emens writes about how desk-clerk law acts to dissuade women from adopting unconventional last names upon marriage, the reasoning is applicable to transsexual gender marker amendments as desk-clerks have less specialized knowledge of transsexual policies, interaction with transsexuals is rare due to transsexuals constituting a small minority, and transsexual gender marker amendments are so variable between state and federal governments.
65. Spade, supra note 14, at 775.
66. Id.
II. Overview of Substantive Due Process

Individuals have due process rights (both procedural and substantive) under the U.S. Constitution and state constitutions. The U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted substantive due process to protect many different rights, including bodily autonomy, privacy, and same-sex intimacy. This Part summarizes two tests that courts might apply to conclude that requiring reassignment surgery to amend gender markers on state documents violates a person’s substantive due process rights: (1) the fundamental rights test, and (2) the Cruzan balancing test.

A. The Fundamental Rights Test

The Supreme Court’s fundamental rights test can be broken into a four-part analysis. The first part analyzes whether the right at issue is fundamental. The Court finds the right fundamental if it is either “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition” or if the right is stated or implied in the Constitution. Importantly, how the court frames the right may determine whether it is fundamental. Indeed, a court may dispute which liberty interest is before it, and how the court interprets the right affects its decision. Nonetheless, the Court articulates that advocates should provide a “careful description” of the liberty interest in dispute.

The second part of the Court’s fundamental rights analysis asks whether the right is burdened. The right may be burdened either directly or incidentally.

69. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (saying that no state shall "deprive a citizen of life, liberty, or property without due process of the law"); see also, e.g., ARK. CONST. art. 2, § 8 [stating that "nor [shall any person] be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law"]; FL. CONST. art. 1, § 9 ("No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law."); ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 2 ("No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law nor be denied the equal protection of the laws.").
70. See generally, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (holding that due process protects the right to same-sex intimacy); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that due process protects a woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that due process protects one’s right to interracial marriage); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that due process protects the right to birth control); id. at 479 (holding that due process protects one’s right to privacy); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (holding that due process protects one’s right to bodily autonomy); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (holding that due process protects one’s right to control the education of his/her children); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (holding that due process protects one’s right to control the education of his/her children).
72. Id. at 721; see also id. at 710–19.
73. See generally Griswold, 381 U.S. at 479.
75. Compare id. at 125 (rejecting and framing the right as whether a man has a right to be involved with his biological child if the mother is married to another man), with id. at 158–59 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (framing the right in question more broadly as whether a man has a right to be involved in the life of his biological child).
76. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721.
law directly burdens a right if the government “singles out protected activity for disadvantageous treatment.” In contrast, a burden is incidental if the law “does not, on its face, regulate protected conduct, but . . . has the incidental effect of burdening a right . . . under some circumstances.” When the Court determines that the right singled out is directly burdened, then it generally applies strict scrutiny. If the burden is incidental, then the Court appears to apply rational basis review, although it may not outright specify a standard of review.

The third part of the analysis asks whether the government action is justified by a sufficient government purpose. This prong largely turns on whether the Court finds the right fundamental. If the Court finds the right fundamental, then it applies strict scrutiny, and the policy must be narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government interest. Otherwise, the Court applies rational basis review, and the policy only needs to be rationally related to achieving a legitimate government interest.

In addition, courts may afford a higher level of scrutiny to liberty interests which are not fundamental rights themselves, but which implicate fundamental rights. While few courts have applied a fundamental rights analysis to gender marker amendments on state documents, one case, Darnell v. Lloyd, held that birth certificates implicate certain fundamental rights.

In Darnell, a post-operative transgender woman brought a claim against the Connecticut Commissioner of Health after he denied her petition to amend the gender marker on her birth certificate. The court denied the commissioner’s motion to dismiss, reasoning that the plaintiff had standing to sue based on the fact that the defendant had amended some birth certificates but not others. The court stressed that since the commissioner had amended some birth certificates, and since birth certificates touched on certain fundamental rights, the commissioner was required to show a substantial government interest to justify denying Darnell’s

78. Id. at 1176–77.
79. See id. at 1176.
80. See id. at 1177–78.
81. Id. For example, in Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978), the Court reviewed a Wisconsin statute that prevented marriage for individuals paying child support absent a court order. Subsequently, a court would not grant the marriage order unless the petitioner was up-to-date on his child support payments. The Court struck the Wisconsin statute, reasoning that the law interfered “directly and substantially” on a fundamental right by prohibiting marriage for some men lacking the financial means to pay child support.
82. Id. at 1177–78. For example, in Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47 (1977), the Court examined a provision of the Social Security Act that terminated child’s insurance benefits upon marriage. The Court upheld the law, reasoning that Congress was justified in tying the benefits to marriage, since a married person generally no longer relies on his parents for financial support. The petitioner argued that the law discouraged marriage for the disabled, but the Court disagreed finding that while the law may discourage marriage for some, the policy simply touched upon marriage and still served a valid and reasonable purpose.
86. Id. at 1214. Notably, Darnell occurred in 1975, before the MSVSA or the original WPATH standards of care, when courts’ and psychologists’ understanding of gender non-conformity was considerably more limited.
87. Id. at 1213.
request to amend her birth certificate.\textsuperscript{88} The court further reasoned that her nonconforming birth certificate affected her fundamental rights to marry, to obtain a conforming passport to travel, and to privacy, as her birth certificate disclosed her transgender status to society.\textsuperscript{89} While the court did not specify the level of scrutiny that it applied, its language suggests that it applied heightened, if not intermediate, scrutiny.\textsuperscript{90}

Similarly, in \textit{Lawrence}, the Court struck down a Texas anti-sodomy statute without declaring a fundamental right to same-sex intimacy.\textsuperscript{91} Instead, the Court determined that the law did not seek to advance a legitimate government interest\textsuperscript{92} and only sought to harm the dignity of gay people living in Texas.\textsuperscript{93} The Court wrote that “liberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct”\textsuperscript{94} and that “[a]t the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.”\textsuperscript{95} The Court found that individuals have a certain autonomy in their existence that the state could not criminalize or stigmatize due to moral concerns.\textsuperscript{96}

Finally, the fourth prong of the fundamental rights analysis examines whether the state’s means justifiably relate to the ends sought. Under rational basis review, the state policy need only reasonably relate to the state’s interest.\textsuperscript{97} Intermediate scrutiny requires a substantial relationship between the means and the state’s interest.\textsuperscript{98} And finally, strict scrutiny requires a “narrowly tailored” policy that is “the least restrictive means” of attaining the state’s interest.\textsuperscript{99} However, there are minor exceptions to the rule. Indeed, in \textit{Lawrence v. Texas}, the Court never declared same-sex intimacy a fundamental right, but appeared to use a higher standard than rational basis review to strike a Texas law banning same-sex sodomy.\textsuperscript{100}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{88} See id.
\item \textsuperscript{89} See id.
\item \textsuperscript{90} Id. (stating that the commissioner must “show some substantial state interest” to justify his refusal to amend Darnell’s birth certificate).
\item \textsuperscript{91} See generally \textit{Lawrence v. Texas}, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
\item \textsuperscript{92} Id. at 577.
\item \textsuperscript{93} Id. at 575, 579.
\item \textsuperscript{94} Id. at 562.
\item \textsuperscript{95} Id. at 574 (quoting \textit{Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey}, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)).
\item \textsuperscript{96} Id. at 577.
\item \textsuperscript{97} \textit{City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr.}, 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985).
\item \textsuperscript{98} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{99} \textit{Bernal v. Fainter}, 467 U.S. 216, 219 (1984) (“In order to withstand strict scrutiny, the law must advance a compelling state interest by the least restrictive means available.”).
\item \textsuperscript{100} \textit{See Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Children & Family Servs.}, 358 F.3d 804, 817 (11th Cir. 2004) (“Most significant, however, is the fact that the \textit{Lawrence} Court never applied strict scrutiny, the proper standard when fundamental rights are implicated, but instead invalidated the Texas statute on rational-basis grounds, holding that it “further[s] no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual” (quoting \textit{Lawrence}, 539 U.S. at 560)). See generally \textit{Lawrence}, 539 U.S. at 558.
\end{itemize}
B. Individual-State Balancing Test

In substantive due process cases involving a right to refuse medical care, the Court has applied a balancing test separate from the fundamental rights analysis detailed above. In certain instances, a state policy may serve a valid state purpose but encroach upon individual liberty interests nonetheless. When this occurs, courts may weigh the competing interests to determine whether the state policy is constitutional.\(^\text{101}\) When applying this test, the Court has generally avoided naming an exact standard of review and has instead focused on the utility of the state’s action relative to the individual’s liberty interests.\(^\text{102}\)

The Court used this balancing test to reach its decision in *Cruzan*, a case dealing with a woman in a persistent vegetative state.\(^\text{103}\) Nancy Cruzan’s friends and family sought an order removing her from life support, allowing her to die according to her wishes. The state required Cruzan’s family to present clear and convincing evidence that she would wish to refuse treatment.\(^\text{104}\) The Court acknowledged that both Cruzan and the state had important interests at stake:\(^\text{105}\) Cruzan had a right to be free of unwanted medical care and to decide her treatment,\(^\text{106}\) while the state had an interest in protecting the lives of its citizens and in preventing errors when the stakes are life and death.\(^\text{107}\) The Court ruled for the state, finding that the clear and convincing evidence standard adequately balanced the state’s interest in protecting life with the individual’s right to refuse unwanted treatment.\(^\text{108}\) In the case of gender marker amendments, the state has an interest in maintaining accurate documentation while the individual has a liberty interest both in obtaining conforming documentation and in refusing unwanted medical procedures.\(^\text{109}\) Therefore, the balancing test set forth in *Cruzan* provides an appropriate alternative to the fundamental rights analysis for purposes of evaluating the constitutionality of the surgery requirement.

III. Analysis

A. Fundamental Rights Analysis

As discussed previously, the Court’s fundamental rights analysis proceeds in four parts: (1) Is there a fundamental right involved? (2) Is the right infringed upon? (3) Is the infringement justified by a sufficient purpose? and (4) Are the government’s means justifiably related to the ends sought?\(^\text{110}\)

\(^{101}\) *Cruzan ex rel. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health*, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990) (“But determining that a person has a ‘liberty interest’ under the Due Process Clause does not end the inquiry: ‘whether respondent’s constitutional rights have been violated must be determined by balancing his liberty interests against the relevant state interests.’” (quoting *Youngberg v. Romero*, 457 U.S. 307, 321 (1982))).


\(^{103}\) *Cruzan*, 497 U.S. at 266.

\(^{104}\) Id. at 275.

\(^{105}\) Id. at 279.

\(^{106}\) Id. at 278.

\(^{107}\) See id. at 280.

\(^{108}\) See id. at 284.

\(^{109}\) See infra Part IV.4

\(^{110}\) See supra Part II.A.
1. Is There a Fundamental Right Involved?

A court should apply strict scrutiny to state restriction of gender marker amendments on state documents if the court finds that an individual possesses a fundamental right to amend those documents. The Court defines fundamental rights as those “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.” Since gender marker amendments are a relatively new phenomenon, the individual liberty interest is likely not a fundamental right under this standard.

Nonetheless, state restrictions on gender marker amendments may still burden other fundamental rights. Indeed, several states recognize a fundamental right to medical privacy. Additionally, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized a liberty interest in medical privacy that the state may not infringe upon. Today, several states’ amendment policies force many transgender people to disclose their transgender status. Nonconforming documentation can disclose several medical statuses: a diagnosis of gender dysphoria, treatment involving hormone-replacement therapy, and an absence of reassignment surgery. In fact, the Second Circuit, the Third Circuit, and several lower district courts have found that certain medical conditions—including transgender status—warrant additional privacy protections.

For example, Powell v. Schriver involved a claim brought by a prison inmate against a prison guard and the prison’s supervisor after the guard disclosed to other inmates that the plaintiff was HIV-positive and transgender. The court found for the plaintiff, noting that transgender status is highly stigmatizing and that

111. See supra Part II.A.
113. See Brittany Ems, Preparing the Workplace for Transition: A Solution to Employment Discrimination Based on Gender Identity, 54 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1329, 1329 (2009–10) (stating that Christine Jorgensen was the first transsexual woman in America to have reassignment surgery in 1953, thus the phenomenon is at most 60 years old).
114. Guardado v. State, 61 So. 3d 1210, 1212-13 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (stating that patients had a “fundamental privacy right” in their medical privacy that a state may not intrude upon absent a compelling state interest); King v. State, 535 S.E.2d 492 (Ga. 2000) (stating about the defendant’s medical records, “In [Georgia], privacy is considered a fundamental constitutional right and is ‘recognized as having a value so essential to individual liberty in our society that [its] infringement merits careful scrutiny by the courts.’” (quoting Ambles v. State, 383 S.E.2d 555 (Ga. 1989))). See also K.L. v. State, Dep’t of Admin., Div. of Motor Vehicles, 2012 WL 2685183, at *4 (Super. Ct. Alaska Mar. 12, 2012) (“Because this right to privacy is explicit [in the Alaskan Constitution], its protections are necessarily more robust and ‘broader in scope’ than those of the implied federal right to privacy.”).
118. See infra Appendix A (assuming the state allows individuals to amend their birth certificates).
120. 175 F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 1999).
121. Powell, 175 F.3d at 108–09.
disclosure exposes the individual “to discrimination and intolerance.” The Second Circuit applied a heightened (or intermediate) level of scrutiny and found that the plaintiff had something less than a fundamental right to privacy in certain information, and that the state may not disclose such information.

In addition, nonconforming documentation implicates another not-quite-fundamental right: the right to define one’s own existence, protected by the U.S. Supreme Court in both Lawrence and Casey. The Lawrence Court stated, “Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, [and] expression,” and, “At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, [and] of the universe.” Lawrence focused on the law’s dignitary harms. Anti-sodomy laws generated further animosity toward an already misunderstood group by reinforcing existing negative attitudes and societal stigmas—that gay people were criminals and sexual deviants. State laws restricting gender marker amendments have the same effect: transgender identities are not valid, and thus transgender people are viewed as confused or mentally ill. Through nonconforming documentation, states delegitimize and invalidate transgender identities, paternalistically dictating transgender persons’ “true” gender to themselves and to society.

Finally, conditioning gender marker amendment upon reassignment surgery burdens a number of other fundamental rights. First, the surgery requirement is coercive and infringes on the fundamental right to bodily autonomy and the fundamental right to refuse unwanted medical procedures. Essentially, the state puts the transgender individual between a rock and a hard place, deciding between disclosing transgender status on documentation or receiving an unwanted and invasive medical procedure. Second, the result of reassignment surgery is permanent sterilization, infringing upon the fundamental right to reproductive autonomy and family planning.

2. Does the State Policy Infringe on the Right?

A right is burdened if a state law or policy makes its exercise more difficult. The U.S. Supreme Court recognizes two types of burdens: (1) direct burdens, where the state policy intentionally regulates the right, and (2) incidental burdens, where the state policy does not seek specifically to infringe the right, but effectively hampers it nonetheless. The Court grants more deference to state

122. Id.
123. Id. at 112 n. 2.
124. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573.
127. See generally Silver, supra note 9.
132. Id.
policies that produce incidental rather than direct burdens.\textsuperscript{133} Furthermore, the Court is more likely to uphold policies that produce insubstantial burdens rather than substantial burdens.\textsuperscript{134} To clarify, indirect burdens may be substantial, such as the burden placed on abortion access by a general law stating that two surgeons must agree before allowing a patient to undergo any surgical procedure.\textsuperscript{135} And a direct burden may be insubstantial, such as the burden placed on the freedom of the press by a one-cent newspaper tax.\textsuperscript{136}

Restrictions on gender marker amendments impose substantial burdens on the rights of transgender people. The Court determines a burden’s substantiality by examining its overall effect on those trying to exercise the right in question.\textsuperscript{137} Zablocki concerned a Wisconsin law forbidding men who were late on child-support payments from marrying.\textsuperscript{138} Similarly, the surgery requirement conditions the availability of conforming documentation upon the completion of reassignment surgery, which the individual may not desire. The Zablocki Court noted that some indigent men may never be able to marry due to an inability to pay alimony,\textsuperscript{139} which directly parallels the prohibitively expensive requirement of reassignment surgery.\textsuperscript{140} Due to costs and personal reasons, the vast majority of transgender people do not undergo reassignment surgery,\textsuperscript{141} and even those who do may be unable to obtain conforming documentation in states that prohibit birth certificate amendments altogether.\textsuperscript{142}

While a single-letter marker on a driver’s license or a birth certificate may seem insignificant, it can drastically impact an individual’s life. Indeed, these state policies directly burden transgender rights by limiting the ability of transgender people to obtain conforming documentation, infringing upon both the liberty interests of medical privacy and self-determination as articulated in Lawrence.$^{143}$ Additionally, these state laws indirectly burden other rights, including the right to bodily autonomy and even the right to vote.\textsuperscript{144}

\textsuperscript{133} Id. at 1177–78.
\textsuperscript{134} Id. at 1221.
\textsuperscript{135} Id.
\textsuperscript{136} Id. Both examples are from Professor Dorf, and the author utilized them only for their clarity.
\textsuperscript{137} Compare Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 387 (1978) (stating that Wisconsin’s marriage ban for people not paying alimony “substantially” interfered with the right to marry), with Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47, 54 (1977) (stating that the federal law may deter only “some people” as the individual could still marry).
\textsuperscript{138} Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 374.
\textsuperscript{139} Id. at 387.
\textsuperscript{140} Silver, supra note 9, at 498 n.51.
\textsuperscript{141} Grant, supra note 2, at 79 (stating that 23% of MtFs and less than 5% of FtMs have had reassignment surgery).
\textsuperscript{142} See infra Appendix A (Idaho, Tennessee, and Ohio).
\textsuperscript{143} Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579 (stating “petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives. The State cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime. ‘It is a promise of the Constitution that there is a realm of personal liberty which the government may not enter.’”).
\textsuperscript{144} As an aside, these lists are not intended to be comprehensive, and many more rights may be directly or indirectly affected.
i. Direct Burdens

State policies restricting gender marker amendments impose a direct burden on transgender rights. First, the infringement is direct because the laws do not expand, but rather limit, one’s ability to obtain gender-conforming documentation.\(^\text{145}\) Indeed, the Maryland Court of Appeals noted in *Heilig* that courts routinely utilized equitable jurisdiction to issue declaratory actions to update and amend state documents.\(^\text{146}\) In fact, the court recognized it could grant any order to amend a state document—including gender markers—under the common law.\(^\text{147}\) The court presumed the Maryland legislature knew the common law prior to passing the statute, interpreting the law not as a limitation, but as legislative recognition of an individual’s ability to change their sex.\(^\text{148}\) However, *Heilig* remains a minority opinion, and most state courts do not read their state’s statute through this lens.\(^\text{149}\) Nevertheless, these restrictions directly single out gender amendments on state documents and limit the court’s jurisdiction relative to the common law, creating a direct burden on transgender people’s ability to obtain conforming documentation vis-à-vis cissexuals.

Further, these restrictions on courts’ equitable jurisdiction create additional problems with immigration policies instituted by the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”).\(^\text{150}\) To verify random identities, the department cross-references identities between the state DMV database and the Social Security Administration.\(^\text{151}\) However, because each agency sets their own standards for amending name and gender, an individual, through no fault of their own, may have conflicting identities between different agencies.\(^\text{152}\) Nevertheless, the DHS’ protocol, upon finding a mismatch between the agencies, is to notify the individual’s employer that its employee has “no match” between agencies.\(^\text{153}\) Upon notification, employers often investigate the discrepancy and discover the employee is transgender.\(^\text{154}\) Indeed, transgender people disproportionately show up in DHS cross-references due to being able to update gender markers with one agency but not another.\(^\text{155}\)

Second, the state’s non-recognition of a transgender person’s gender identity creates a social precedent that others follow. In *Lawrence*, the Court struck down Texas’ sodomy ban for infringing upon the liberty interest of gay and lesbian couples to define their concept of existence without the state’s moral judgment.\(^\text{156}\)

\(^{145}\) *In re* Heilig, 816 A.2d 68, 80–81 (Md. 2003).

\(^{146}\) *Id.*

\(^{147}\) *Id.*

\(^{148}\) *Id.; see also* Jeffery L. Friesen, *When Common Law Courts Interpret Civil Codes*, 15 Wis. Int’l L. J. 1, 10-11 (1996) (stating that absent a legislative intent, a court will not overturn the common law, but interpret statutory and common law in such a way that is consistent).

\(^{149}\) *See infra* Appendix A; *see also* supra Part I.A.

\(^{150}\) Spade, supra note 14, at 737.

\(^{151}\) *Id.*

\(^{152}\) *Id.* at 734.

\(^{153}\) *Id.* at 738.

\(^{154}\) *Id.*

\(^{155}\) *Id.*

\(^{156}\) Tribe, supra note 125, at 1896.
Essentially, the law in *Lawrence* was an attempt to stigmatize same-sex intimacy and reinforce negative perceptions of gay and lesbian people.\textsuperscript{157} Similarly, states’ refusal to amend gender markers on documents serves as a message that a transgender person’s gender identity is incorrect; this directly burdens the liberty interest of self-determination.

In addition, when states send these messages, they create societal precedent. Forty percent of transgender people who present nonconforming documentation report harassment.\textsuperscript{158} One of the most common forms of harassment is “misgendering,” or identifying a transgender person with incorrect pronouns. This behavior stems from a disrespectful belief that a transgender person’s gender identity is misguided and the person is confused.\textsuperscript{159} The state, by invalidating a transgender person’s gender identity, tacitly endorses this type of social harassment. Similar to a person referring to a homosexual as a “criminal” or a “sex offender” pre-*Lawrence*, a person misgendering a transgender person is not saying anything the state, acting as a proxy for society, does not recognize as true.

Further, many non-state actors will follow the state’s social precedent, often resulting in the exclusion of transgender people from social benefits and protections; indeed, most homeless and abuse shelters segregate on the basis of birth gender.\textsuperscript{160} Since shelters segregate on this basis, transgender men are housed with women and transgender women are housed with men, outing transgender people utilizing these services. Thus, it is not surprising that fifty-five percent of transgender people in homeless shelters report harassment, twenty-two percent report sexual assault, and twenty-nine percent report a complete inability to enter homeless shelters.\textsuperscript{161} Indeed, Dr. Kerith Conron stated it is impossible to get an accurate estimate of homeless transgender people because shelter policies constructively force so many of them to leave.\textsuperscript{162} Further, prisons segregate on the basis of genitals, housing pre-operative transgender women with men.\textsuperscript{163} One study found almost two-thirds of transgender women in male prison report sexual abuse, which is well above the four percent reported among the general prison population.\textsuperscript{164}

Finally, these policies directly burden transgender people’s liberty interest in medical privacy. While the right to medical privacy is not sacrosanct, there is a noticeable divide between cases upholding or invalidating state policies. If the information is collected, stored, and kept private, then the state is more likely to

\textsuperscript{157} Id.

\textsuperscript{158} Grant, supra note 2, at 139.


\textsuperscript{160} Grant, supra note 2, at 106.

\textsuperscript{161} Id. at 4.


\textsuperscript{163} Spade, supra note 14, at 782. It is also worth noting that some prisons segregate on the basis of birth sex, meaning that some post-op transwomen are imprisoned with men. Id.

prevail. If the information is made public without serving a legitimate government interest then a court is less likely to uphold the state action. Essentially, the government may collect, but not distribute, an individual’s medical information. However, state policies inhibit transgender people from obtaining conforming documentation, forcing them to disclose their sensitive medical histories. In essence, the state transforms a person’s means of identification—a necessity in today’s society—into a de facto scarlet letter, disclosing their stigmatized status to society.

Since documentation is necessary and ubiquitous, forced disclosure of medical status occurs in several areas. For example, identity documentation is necessary for employment. Due to the Immigration Reform Control Act, employers must verify the citizenship of prospective employees. While the statute allows several documents to prove citizenship, employers most often rely on birth certificates and driver’s licenses. Possessing nonconforming documentation forces the individual to either explain the discrepancy and disclose their transgender status or forego employment to avoid the inevitably embarrassing situation. Indeed, one study found as many as seventy percent of transgender people in the United States are unemployed. Almost fifty percent of transgender employees report experiencing an adverse employment action, and just over one in four individuals specifically report losing a job due to being transgender. With such bleak employment figures, it is no surprise that seventy-one percent of transgender employees hide their transgender status from their employers because they fear an adverse action.

Most jurisdictions lack gender identity protections in employment, further complicating employment matters. In fact, of the twenty-four states requiring reassignment surgery to amend birth certificates, only seven have laws protecting transgender people in the workplace. While some federal courts interpret Title VII to include a prohibition of gender identity and expression discrimination within the definition of “sex” discrimination, the circuits are split. Indeed, most circuits

165. See also In re Search Warrant (sealed), 810 F.2d 67 (3rd Cir. 1987) (allowing a state to examine medical records regarding a patient’s alleged insurance fraud). See generally Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977) (upholding New York’s medical record collections for painkiller prescriptions to a secret database that only the state may access).

166. See generally State ex Rel Callahan v. Kinder, 879 S.W.2d 677 (Mo. App. 1994) (preventing an inmate’s forcible HIV disclosure to a courthouse, which would then become part of the public record). See also Jane Doe v. Borough of Barrington, 729 F.Supp 376 (D.N.J. 1990).


170. Id.

171. Grant, supra note 2, at 53.

172. Id.


have not ruled on whether Title VII protection applies to transgender employees.\textsuperscript{176} Essentially, the lack of adequate legal protections puts many transgender employees in a winless situation because most transgender people must disclose their gender identity via birth certificates during the employment process, after which employers can openly discriminate against them, while prospective employees have no legal recourse. The situation is further complicated by the fact that even when legal protections exist, they are \textit{ad hoc} and the evidentiary burdens can be difficult to prove.\textsuperscript{177}

This forced disclosure and subsequent discrimination is an issue outside of just employment. In housing, nineteen percent of transgender people report discrimination, and eleven percent report eviction due to their landlords discovering their gender identity.\textsuperscript{178} Regarding police, twenty-two percent of transgender individuals report harassment from law enforcement, six percent report physical assault, and two percent report sexual assault.\textsuperscript{179} Additionally, in New York City, fifty-nine percent of transgender women report being detained by police and profiled as sex workers due to being transgender.\textsuperscript{180}

\textit{ii. Incidental Burdens}

In addition, the policies incidentally burden the rights of transgender people. Typically, incidental burdens arise when a policy seeks to regulate one phenomenon but collaterally inhibits the practice of a right. Generally, courts grant more deference to burdens that are incidental as opposed to direct. In the area of gender marker amendments, state policies condition conforming documentation on reassignment surgery, which incidentally burdens the right to bodily autonomy and even the right to vote.

The surgical requirement incidentally burdens the right to bodily autonomy as it coerces the individual to undergo unwanted and unnecessary surgery if they wish to change their gender marker and obtain conforming documentation that would allow one to enjoy the full benefits of society.\textsuperscript{181} Most concerning, the surgical requirement turns invasively and voyeuristically on whether the individual has undergone reassignment surgery rather than the validity of gender dysphoria, which compels the individual’s cross-gender identification. Thus, the state focuses less on the individual and more on the medical procedure, violating the individual’s bodily autonomy and their right to define their gender identity absent unwanted surgeries.\textsuperscript{182}

Finally, the third view holds that Title VII protects “males and females” and not transsexuals. Etsitty v. Utah Transit Authority, 502 F.3d 1215, 1222 (10th Cir. 2007).

176. \textit{Id.}


178. Grant, supra note 2, at 4.

179. Grant, supra note 2, at 158.


182. Silver, supra note 9, at 504.
Additionally, nonconforming documentation burdens transgender people's voting rights. The Supreme Court held voting is a fundamental right.\textsuperscript{183} However, since 2010, thirty-four states have passed voter identification laws requiring voters to present photo-identification to poll-workers before voting.\textsuperscript{184} People lacking adequate identification cannot vote.\textsuperscript{185} Adequate identification is a photographic ID or a driver's license lacking anomalies.\textsuperscript{186} Many transgender voters do not update their driver's licenses.\textsuperscript{187} Indeed thirty-three percent of transgender people do not possess any conforming identification.\textsuperscript{188} Thus, a person appearing to be a male may present a female driver's license at a poll location only to be turned away, unable to vote. As a result, many transgender voters are disenfranchised.\textsuperscript{189} A recent report out of the Williams Institute estimated 24,000 transgender voters in ten states may have been disenfranchised in 2014 as a result of voter identification laws and an inability to obtain conforming documentation.\textsuperscript{190} This number is likely an underestimate because an additional twenty-four states have similar voter identification laws.\textsuperscript{191} Finally, since the Court upheld the validity of voter ID laws,\textsuperscript{192} states with these laws have a stronger obligation to provide individuals with the conforming documentation necessary to exercise the right to vote.

3. \textit{Is the Government Action Justified by Sufficient Purpose?}

The third prong examines the state interests behind the policy in dispute. The Court classifies the state interest as (from most to least significant) compelling, important, legitimate, or none of the above.\textsuperscript{193} States generally raise three interests to justify their policies regarding gender marker amendments: (1) accurate records and government efficiency, (2) prevent fraud, and (3) national security.\textsuperscript{194} The first state interest is keeping and maintaining accurate records for government purposes.\textsuperscript{195} The argument posits that, until surgery, a transgender woman is male, and the record should reflect that. However, various agencies are enhanced by allowing these amendments, as public identification is easier with a

\textsuperscript{183} See U.S. CONST., art. II; U.S. CONST. amend. XV, XIX, XXIV, and XXVI; see generally Kramer v Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (holding that New York's policy of allowing only people living in the school zone or parents sending children to the school to vote on school board elections was not narrowly tailored).
\textsuperscript{185} Id. at 2.
\textsuperscript{186} Id.
\textsuperscript{187} Id.
\textsuperscript{188} Grant, supra note 2, at 139.
\textsuperscript{189} Herman, supra note 184, at 2.
\textsuperscript{190} Id. at 4.
\textsuperscript{191} Id. at 1.
\textsuperscript{192} See generally Veasey v. Perry, 135 S.Ct. 9 (2014).
\textsuperscript{194} Mottet, supra note 17, at 413–16.
state record that conforms to the individual.\textsuperscript{196} Additionally, conforming documentation makes cross-referencing more efficient because the individual would have one and not two identities between government agencies. The Supreme Court has stated the government has a legitimate interest in “promoting efficiency and integrity in the discharge of official duties.”\textsuperscript{197}

Another interest states often raise is that people may abuse an amendment system, so the state should not grant amendments until the person has undergone permanent alterations.\textsuperscript{198} The fear is people may pretend to transition to commit fraud, and the state should not burden itself unless the individual can show their cross-gender identification is real. However, as noted in Heilig, reassignment surgery is not the only permanent procedure an individual can undergo.\textsuperscript{199} Indeed, a number of other medical surgeries are equally permanent.\textsuperscript{200} Contrary to Heilig, even hormone-replacement therapy causes permanent changes.\textsuperscript{201} Along this line, many states argue that allowing amendments may incentivize same-sex couples to abuse the process to get married.\textsuperscript{202} However, such an interest is moot as same-sex marriage bans were declared unconstitutional in the case of Obergefell v. Hodges.\textsuperscript{203} While the Supreme Court has noted that preventing fraud is a legitimate government interest, if the Court believes the state is invoking fraud as a pretext to harm an unpopular minority, then it will deem the interest as neither compelling, important, nor legitimate.\textsuperscript{204} Further, while the state has interests in preventing fraud and maintaining accurate records, these interests are similarly protected by policies that do not require reassignment surgery.

The third interest states typically propose for the surgical requirement is national security. Indeed, the belief terrorists may pretend to be transgender in order to elude security measures is not rare.\textsuperscript{205} National security concerns and federal standardization of state documents ultimately led New York to retain the surgical requirement in 2006.\textsuperscript{206} Additionally, some proposed amendments to the 2005 REAL ID Act would require magnetic strips on driver’s licenses to contain information related to previous names and gender.\textsuperscript{207} Most national security concerns focus not on intentional regulation of transgender documents, but rather

\textsuperscript{196} Mottet, \textit{supra} note 17, at 415.
\textsuperscript{198} Mottet, \textit{supra} note 17, at 416 n. 181 (quoting New York City’s health commissioner as saying “surgery versus nonsurgery can be arbitrary. . . . Somebody with a beard may have had breast-implant surgery. It’s the permanence of the transition that matters most”).
\textsuperscript{199} \textit{In re} Heilig, 816 A.2d 68, 85–87 (Md. 2003).
\textsuperscript{200} \textit{See} id.
\textsuperscript{201} \textit{See} Harper Jean Tobin, \textit{Against the Surgical Requirement for Change of Legal Sex}, 38 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 393, 396 n. 12 (2007).
\textsuperscript{202} Littleton v. Prange 9 S.W.3d 223 (Tex. App. 1999) (stating about gender “There are some things we cannot will into being. They just are” to deny the validity of a marriage between a cissexual male and a post-operative transgender female); \textit{see generally} \textit{In re} Estate of Gardiner, 42 P.3d 120 (Kan. 2002); \textit{In Re} Nash. Nos. 2002-T-0149 & 2002-T-0179, WL 23097095 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003) (voiding a marriage between a woman and a post-op transsexual male due to the state’s ban on same sex marriage).
\textsuperscript{203} 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
\textsuperscript{204} \textit{See} Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 535 (1973).
\textsuperscript{205} \textit{See} Spade, \textit{supra} note 14, at 808–09 n. 350 (noting that in 2002, “the Department of Transportation issued a warning to airport security to look out for ‘men in dresses’ as potential threats”).
\textsuperscript{206} \textit{Id.} at 793.
\textsuperscript{207} \textit{Id.} at 798.
on the process of standardizing these documents throughout the state.\textsuperscript{208} Still, advocates remain skeptical that terrorists may pretend to be transgender to evade security measures, stating “the last thing a person who is trying to blend in and escape notice should do is dress in the opposite gender.”\textsuperscript{209} In the past, the Supreme Court has held that national security is a compelling government interest.\textsuperscript{210}

4. Are the Government’s Means Justifiably Related to the Ends Sought?

The final prong of the fundamental rights analysis examines the means-ends fit between the state’s and individual’s interests. If the court determines that a right is fundamental, then it should apply strict scrutiny and require the state’s policy be “narrowly tailored” to achieving a “compelling government interest.”\textsuperscript{211} If the court determines a right is not fundamental, then it should apply rational basis review, which only requires that the state policy be “reasonably related” to achieving a “legitimate interest.”\textsuperscript{212} Finally, if the individual’s liberty interest is something less than a fundamental right but should be reviewed under a more stringent standard than rational basis review, then the court should apply intermediate scrutiny requiring the state policy to “substantially relate” to achieving an “important interest.”\textsuperscript{213}

Here, the proper level of review is likely intermediate scrutiny. The right to medical privacy is “something less than fundamental,” and often receives intermediate scrutiny.\textsuperscript{214} Further, one of the few cases to hear the issue of transgender marker amendments used language implying the application of intermediate scrutiny.\textsuperscript{215} In addition, the Eastern District of Michigan recently heard a case dealing with the issue of gender marker amendments to driver’s licenses, and it applied strict scrutiny, noting the plaintiffs’ interest in privacy.\textsuperscript{216}

Should a court apply intermediate scrutiny, these policies would not suffice. National security aside, state interests behind the surgical requirement are at most legitimate and not important interests according to prior Supreme Court cases.\textsuperscript{217} Even if we assume these interests are important, they still fail because they do not substantially relate to the ends sought. Indeed, each of these interests, including national security, suffers from a fatal flaw that attenuates the relation between the policy and the state’s interest.\textsuperscript{218}

\textsuperscript{208} Id. at 808 n. 350.
\textsuperscript{209} Mottet, supra note 17, at 414.
\textsuperscript{211} City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985).
\textsuperscript{212} Id.
\textsuperscript{213} Id.
\textsuperscript{214} Powell v. Schriner, 175 F.3d 107, 112 (2d Cir. 1999) n.2.
\textsuperscript{217} See Moreno, 413 U.S. at 535 (finding that preventing fraud is a legitimate interest); see also Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S., 150-51 (finding government efficiency and accurate records is a legitimate interest).
\textsuperscript{218} See supra Part III.A.3.
Nevertheless, even were a court to apply rational basis these policies would still fail because they do not serve a legitimate interest. As noted in Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, a bare desire to harm an unpopular minority cannot suffice for a legitimate government interest. In contrast, states did not craft policies requiring reassignment surgery to stigmatize transgender people. Instead, states adopted these policies to allow transgender people to obtain conforming documents, fashioning their laws after the MSVSA, which adopted the medical consensus of its time. However, the medical community’s view of gender non-conformity during this period was rigid and paternalistic. Since then, the medical community abandoned requiring reassignment surgery. Thus, these laws were adopted due to a simplistic and outdated view of gender non-conformity and not a bare desire to harm or stigmatize.

Nonetheless, today states cannot insist they retain the surgical requirement to accommodate transgender people. The field of transgender health care is evolving and the law should depend on the medical science. When states ignore the current medical view and retain outdated policies, they do not serve the best interest of their people. Indeed, both WPATH and the AMA removed the surgical requirement finding that it caused the patient more harm than good.

B. Cruzan Balancing Analysis

An alternative test courts might apply in evaluating whether gender amendment restrictions violate a transgender person’s substantive due process rights is the Cruzan balancing test. In cases where both the state and the individual have vital interests, a court may weigh the interests of the two to determine whether the state policy is justified. The Court considers several factors under this test. Because of this, the test sometimes appears similar to rational basis and other times more similar to strict scrutiny. States most often prevail when invoking their police powers to protect the public’s “general comfort, health, and prosperity,” as well as safety. As previously stated, the surgical requirement does little to achieve these interests, while requiring a highly intrusive
burden from the individual. Thus courts should not apply deferential review to laws requiring reassignment surgery to amend documents.

To illustrate the balancing approach, it might be helpful to view various stages of transition as a continuum from left to right: facial hair removal, therapist recognition of gender dysphoria, hormone replacement therapy, breast augmentation, hysterectomy, and reassignment surgery. If the policy is further to the left, it is easier for both cisgender and transgender individuals to amend documents. The further right the state goes, the harder it is for an individual to obtain conforming documentation. The illustration highlights that transgender people generally desire to go further right. Conversely, cisgender people trying to abuse the system want to stay to the left to avoid permanent and costly procedures. Thus, beyond a certain point, there are diminishing returns to the policies: each step to the right prevents a larger number of transgender people from obtaining conforming documents while preventing fewer instances of abuse. Ideally, public policy should strike a balance that both deters the most amount of fraud while allowing the greatest number of transgender people to obtain conforming documents.

As stated in Part III.A.3, states present three interests for requiring reassignment surgery to amend state documents: (1) accurate records and government efficiency, (2) fraud, and (3) national security.

Similarly, transgender people have several interests in obtaining conforming documentation. The first interest is social recognition. As stated, government recognition of sex serves as a proxy for society. This interest is two-fold. First, it tells society that it is wrong to invasively question a transgender person’s gender identity. Second, it tells transgender people that their gender identities are valid and they are accepted to participate in society.

Additionally, transgender people have an interest in forgoing a surgical procedure they may not feel is necessary for their happiness. Much like Cruzan recognized, people have a common law right to be free of an unwanted medical procedures. Indeed, “the inviolability of the human body is the most important aspect of privacy,” and the right is “as old as the common law.” However, states condition the first interest (social acceptance) on obtaining reassignment surgery, unfairly coercing transgender people into the unwanted medical procedures Cruzan was meant to protect against. The individual also has an interest in documentation that does not disclose their sensitive medical

---

232. Grant, supra note 2, at 139 (noting that only 24% of transsexuals have a conforming birth certificate).
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Grant, supra note 2, at 85 (stating that about one half of transsexual males have no interest in reassignment surgery).
238. Id.
239. Id. at 1106.
240. Silver, supra note 9, at 489–90.
information. Additionally, nonconforming documentation most often “outs” transgender people to society, often resulting in harassment, violence, or death.

Finally, transgender people have an interest in possessing identical cross-agency identification. As the war on terror continues and an increasing number of government agencies cross-reference identities, more rights and privileges may inevitably become conditioned on conforming documentation and records. Federal policies cause state DMVs and the Social Security Administration to cross-reference records with other agencies. When a cross-reference results in a “no match,” either the SSA notifies the employer of the discrepancy or the DMV revokes the individual’s driving privileges. As technology improves and these processes become cheaper, it is intuitive they will become more prevalent. With increased reliance on cross-referencing to deter fraud, more rights and privileges may depend upon various agencies having identical records. Thus, it is imperative for transgender people to obtain conforming documents.

IV. IDEAL POLICY PROPOSAL

The ideal policy balances the state’s interests in accurate documentation with the transgender person’s interest in privacy, dignity, and autonomy. As stated in Lawrence, there is a “realm of personal liberty that the government may not enter.” The state has an interest it may safeguard, however, beyond a certain point, it cannot justify its intrusion into the individual’s life.

Primarily, the surgical requirement to amend state documents should be struck as violating substantive due process. While states implemented the surgical requirement to accommodate transgender people who wished to obtain conforming documentation, it now reflects an outdated view of gender transition. Early views believed all transgender people had similar formative experiences and thus desired similar experiences from their transitions. Today, this belief coerces transgender people into undergoing surgeries they may not desire thereby violating both their dignity and bodily autonomy. Additionally, rejecting the surgical requirements represents a growing consensus among states and the global community. Indeed, the United Nations recently stated surgical requirements for transgender and intersex people are a violation of basic human rights.

More so, the surgical requirement is untenable with the current medical needs of transgender people. Transgender individuals largely seek to “pass” as their identified gender and blend-in among society, which the surgical requirement

241. See supra Part III.A.2.i.
243. Spade, supra note 14, at 791.
244. Id. at 797.
245. Id. at 797–801; see also Wenstrom, supra note 195, at 146.
246. See generally Spade, supra note 181, at 228.
inhibits via nonconforming documentation disclosing a private medical status. Indeed, the only way the individual may obtain conforming documentation while minimizing disclosures and discrimination is to undergo costly and invasive surgery they may not wish to have. In essence, the requirement places surgical and financial burdens on an otherwise marginalized group should they wish to blend into society.

States may require court orders to amend state documents, but this only occurs under limited situations. Much like Casey, requiring an individual to petition a court and present affidavits from therapists is not so intrusive to the individual. However, court orders should be kept under seal and not become part of the public record. As several HIV cases noted, forced disclosures to the court violated the petitioners’ right to privacy as the disclosures became viewable by the public.\(^ {251} \) Gender nonconformity is similarly situated because it is socially stigmatized and an intimate medical diagnosis.

Therefore, the ideal policy allows transgender people to amend gender markers with a therapist’s recommendation. First, this policy grants the individual acceptance and recognition in their gender transition, which can be a tumultuous time. Second, it allows transgender people to keep intimate medical history private, minimizing discrimination that they might face. Third, requiring a therapist’s support acts as a gate-keeper against people who may abuse the system to commit fraud.

Finally, this ideal proposal is also endorsed by the AMA\(^ {252} \) and WPATH.\(^ {253} \) Therefore, it represents the current medical consensus. Speaking for the AMA, its President Ardis Dee Hoven said, “For many transgender people, a needless operation should not be a government requirement to amend a sex designation on a birth certificate.” Additionally, WPATH stated gender identity documents should depend on “self-defined gender,” and the process should be “simple, timely, [and] low cost or free.”\(^ {254} \)

**CONCLUSION**

In conclusion, most transgender people generally cannot obtain conforming documents. Possessing nonconforming documentation forces the individual to disclose sensitive medical history, prevents the individual from enjoying the full rights and privileges of society, and acts as a moral judgment invalidating the individual’s gender identity. More so, the surgical requirement infringes the fundamental rights of bodily autonomy, forgoing unwanted medical treatment, and procreation through sterilization of the individual. Additionally, these laws cannot stand under an individual-state balancing test. The individual is subject to excessive and invasive burdens that do nothing to benefit public health, welfare, or safety. In sum, nonconforming documentation and the surgical requirement raise substantive due process concerns.

Finally, courts should require states to allow document amendments absent reassignment surgery. States may require medical proof before amending

\(^ {251} \) See generally Doe v. Se. Pennsylvania Transp. Auth., 72 F.3d 1133 (3d Cir. 1995); see also Mottet, supra note 17, at 437.

\(^ {252} \) Am. Med. Ass’n., supra note 5.

\(^ {253} \) Coleman et al., supra note 5, at 2.

\(^ {254} \) Id. at 9.
documents, but such proof should be limited to a therapist’s affidavit indicating the patient is undergoing treatment for gender dysphoria. This proposal adequately balances the state interests with those of the individual because therapists can act as gatekeepers and prevent potential abuses of the system, and transgender people can more easily obtain conforming documentation. Moreover, therapists are in a better position to know what is best for transgender patients than the state is. As medical knowledge of gender non-conformity continues to expand, the surgical requirement now stands as an unnecessary and cruel violation of transgender people’s substantive due process rights and dignity.
## APPENDIX A - BIRTH CERTIFICATE AMENDMENTS LAWS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>SRS\textsuperscript{255} required</th>
<th>Court Order Required</th>
<th>Therapist Approval</th>
<th>Additional Information</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alabama\textsuperscript{256}</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>SRS is not required by statute, but is required by the state Office of Vital Statistics (&quot;OVS&quot;).\textsuperscript{258}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alaska\textsuperscript{257}</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>Will also amend a birth certificate if a chromosome test shows a nontraditional set.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arizona\textsuperscript{259}</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Will issue amended birth certificates for Connecticut residents born in other states.\textsuperscript{264}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arkansas\textsuperscript{260}</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California\textsuperscript{261}</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colorado\textsuperscript{262}</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connecticut\textsuperscript{263}</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delaware\textsuperscript{265}</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District of Columbia\textsuperscript{266}</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{255} Sexual Reassignment Surgery

\textsuperscript{256} ALA. CODE §22-9a-19(d) (1997) (stating "[u]pon receipt of a certified copy of an order of a court of competent jurisdiction indicating that the sex of an individual born in this state has been changed by surgical procedure and that the name of the individual has been changed, the certificate of birth of the individual shall be amended as prescribed by rules to reflect the changes" [hereinafter MSVSA policy]).

\textsuperscript{257} ALASKA STAT. §18.50.290 (2005) (stating "[u]pon receipt of a certified copy of a court order...").


\textsuperscript{259} ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-337 (A)(3) (2006) (stating "[t]he state registrar shall amend birth certificates... [f]or a person who has undergone a sex change operation or has a chromosomal count that establishes the sex of the person different than in the registered birth certificate").


\textsuperscript{261} CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 103426 (2014).


\textsuperscript{263} CONN. AGENCIES REGS. §19a-41-9(e).

\textsuperscript{264} CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-42b (stating "[i]n the case of a person who is a resident of this state and was born in another state... the probate courts in this state shall have jurisdiction to issue such a decree of a change of sex").

\textsuperscript{265} 16-4000-4200 DEL. ADMIN. CODE § 4205(10.9.4) (requiring MSVSA Policy).

\textsuperscript{266} D.C. CODE ANN. § 7-217(d) (West 2013), amended by JAPARKER DEONI JONES BIRTH CERTIFICATE EQUALITY AMENDMENT ACT OF 2013, D.C. Law 20-37 §§11a(aj)(2)(A) (effective Nov. 5, 2013) (2013) (requiring physician’s affidavit indicating that "individual has undergone surgical, hormonal, or other treatment... for the purpose of gender transition").
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>SRS Required</th>
<th>Surgery Required</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>State OVS interprets statute to require SRS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Statute is silent on transsexual amendments, but the State OVS does not allow.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawaii</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Statute is silent on transsexual amendments, but the State OVS does not allow.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Idaho</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>State OVS interprets statute to require SRS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Statute is silent on transsexual amendments, but the State OVS does not allow.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indiana</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Statute is silent on transsexual amendments, but the State OVS does not allow.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iowa</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Statute is silent on transsexual amendments, but the State OVS does not allow.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kansas</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Statute is silent on transsexual amendments, but the State OVS does not allow.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kentucky</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Statute is silent on transsexual amendments, but the State OVS does not allow.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louisiana</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Statute is silent on transsexual amendments, but the State OVS does not allow.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maine</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Statute is silent on transsexual amendments, but the State OVS does not allow.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

268. Steen, supra note 258.
270. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 338-17.7(a)(4)(B) (2005) (requiring that a surgeon verify that “[t]he birth registrant has had a sex change operation and the sex designation on the birth registrant’s birth certificate is no longer correct”).
271. IDAHO ADMIN. CODE § 16.02.08.201 (2006).
272. Steen, supra note 258.
273. 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 535/17(1)(d) (2006) (requiring “[a]n affidavit by a physician that he has performed an operation on a person, and that by reason of the operation the sex designation on such person’s birth record should be changed”).
274. Steen, supra note 258.
276. IOWA CODE ANN. § 144.23(3) (2004) [requiring “[a] notarized affidavit by a licensed [physician] . . . stating that by reason of surgery or other treatment by the licensee, the sex designation of the person has been changed”).
282. Lambda Legal, supra note 277.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>X</th>
<th>X</th>
<th>X</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maryland</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Massachusetts</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michigan</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minnesota</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mississippi</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missouri</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montana</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nebraska</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nevada</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Hampshire</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Jersey</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Mexico</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York City</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York State</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

State has generic MSVSA statute, but it is interpreted by the court to only require “permanent” change under *In re Heilig*.

Statute does not mention amendments for gender markers, state OVS requires two therapists’ approvals and a court order.

House Bill No. 2659 was proposed in Feb. 2014. If passed, it only requires therapist approval.

---

284. 816 A.2d 68, 87 (Md. 2003).
285. MASS GEN. LAWS ANN. CH. 46, § 13(e) (2006) (“If a person has completed sex reassignment surgery, ... the birth record of said person shall be amended to reflect the newly acquired sex and name.”).
286. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.2831(c) (2006).
292. NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-604.01 (2005).
293. NEV. ADMIN. CODE. Ch. 440, § 130 (2006) (requiring patient undergo a “sexual transformation”).
298. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. Tit. 24, § 207.05 (requiring “convertive surgery”); see also Birney v. New York City Dept. of Health and Mental Hygiene, 950 N.Y.S.2d 607 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2012) (interpreting “convertive surgery” to require SRS).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>SRS Requirement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North Carolina</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Dakota</td>
<td>X X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oklahoma</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oregon</td>
<td>X X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pennsylvania</td>
<td>X X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhode Island</td>
<td>X X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Carolina</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Dakota</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tennessee</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utah</td>
<td>X X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vermont</td>
<td>X X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virginia</td>
<td>X X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

State OVS interprets statute to require SRS.

State OVS interprets statute to not require SRS.

State OVS interprets statute to require SRS.

State OVS interprets statute to require SRS.

State OVS interprets statute to require SRS.

State OVS interprets statute to require SRS.

State OVS interprets statute to require SRS.

State OVS interprets statute to require SRS.

State OVS interprets statute to require SRS.

State OVS interprets statute to require SRS.

State OVS interprets statute to require SRS.

State OVS interprets statute to require SRS.

State OVS interprets statute to require SRS.

State OVS interprets statute to require SRS.

State OVS interprets statute to require SRS.

State OVS interprets statute to require SRS.

State OVS interprets statute to require SRS.

State OVS interprets statute to require SRS.

State OVS interprets statute to require SRS.

State OVS interprets statute to require SRS.

State OVS interprets statute to require SRS.

State OVS interprets statute to require SRS.

State OVS interprets statute to require SRS.

State OVS interprets statute to require SRS.

State OVS interprets statute to require SRS.

State OVS interprets statute to require SRS.

State OVS interprets statute to require SRS.

State OVS interprets statute to require SRS.
| State          | X | X | Washington state does not have a statute regarding birth certificate amendments, though the OVS issues amended birth certificates upon a therapist’s approval.  
319 |
|----------------|---|---|---|
| West Virginia  | X | X | Statute does not mention amendments for transsexuals, though the state OVS interprets statute to require SRS and a court order.  
321 |
| Wisconsin      | X | X |  
322 |
| Wyoming        | X |   |  
323 |

### Appendix B - Driver's License Amendment Policies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>SRS required</th>
<th>Therapist Approval</th>
<th>Court Order</th>
<th>Any other conforming documentation</th>
<th>Conforming Birth Certificate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alabama</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alaska</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arizona</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arkansas</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colorado</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connecticut</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delaware</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District of Columbia</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawaii</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Idaho</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indiana</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iowa</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kansas</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kentucky</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louisiana</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maine</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maryland</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Massachusetts</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michigan</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minnesota</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mississippi</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missouri</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montana</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nebraska</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nevada</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Hampshire</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Jersey</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Mexico</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Carolina</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Dakota</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oklahoma</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oregon</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pennsylvania</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>X</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rhode Island</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Carolina</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Dakota</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tennessee</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utah</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vermont</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virginia</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Virginia</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wisconsin</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wyoming</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>